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abstract
The paper presents an overview of the current situation in personal income tax 
non-standard reliefs for the EU-15, most of the EU-12, Croatia and countries of 
the region, as well as a comparison of them for 2006-2011. A review of personal 
income tax relief issues in last twenty years is given, especially concerning the re-
action of the entire personal income tax system to the economic and financial cri-
ses. It is followed by comparative analysis of non-standard tax reliefs in the stated 
period. Despite the mostly negative attitude of tax theory (and policy), economic 
crisis and fiscal consolidation, they still play very significant role. The EU-15 ac-
tually broadened these reliefs in the period observed, while the analyzed EU-12, 
Croatia and countries of the region with less developed non-standard tax reliefs 
have reduced them significantly. Many of these countries, accordingly, have none 
today. Since the introduction of the new personal income tax system in 1994 Cro-
atia has gone a long way, from their complete exclusion to the inclusion of almost 
all of them and in the end the exclusion of almost all of them.
Keywords: non-standard tax reliefs, personal income tax, European Union, Croa-
tia, economic crisis
1 introduction
The tax reform of the 1980s already required the reduction/repeal of the different 
tax reliefs (besides the rate reduction). This was especially pronounced for perso-
nal income tax and related non-standard reliefs. Not only were their negative fiscal 
effects put forward, but also their inefficiency (“neutrality” distortions and high 
revenue forgone in comparison with effects/benefits of those reliefs too), horizo-
ntal and vertical equity distortions as well as their complexity and non-transpa-
rency. 
The stated requirement of tax base broadening was also implemented in the tax re-
forms of transition countries. Together with the request for rate reduction, it con-
stitutes the basic recommendations for tax policy. These demands were re newed, 
gaining in importance during the economic and financial crisis and resulting fiscal 
consolidation. Repeal of non-standard reliefs is believed not only to contribute to 
the fiscal consolidation, but also to boost economic growth: directly – because of 
their above stated disadvantages, as well as indirectly – through making room for 
a personal income tax rate reduction (for instance OECD, 2010a).
In this paper a normative qualitative analysis is performed, which combines inter-
national and dynamic comparison. An international overview of non-standard tax 
reliefs for 2006 (Blažić, 2006:153-154, 156) is repeated for the end of 2011, fol-
lowing the same methodology. The reason behind such comparison was not only 
to detect the five year period changes, but also to perceive the changes influenced 
by the economic and financial crises. Namely, by comparing pre-crisis 2006 data 
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ght: How much have the repeated requests for tax base broadening, especially em-
phasized in the crisis (and “post-crisis”?) period, really influenced the tax sy-
stems? A comparison of non-standard personal income tax reliefs was performed 
for the EU-15, some EU-12 (all except the Baltic countries, Malta and Cyprus) 
and countries of the region with special emphasis on Croatia.
At the beginning of the paper, after shorter definition of non-standard reliefs, a re-
view of the literature concerning trends and analysis of tax reliefs is given. Si nce 
the paper is mostly oriented to the period of the crisis, the stress is laid to the re-
actions of personal income tax to the crisis, not only concerning non-standard re-
liefs, but also its other elements (rates, brackets, standard reliefs). According to 
the standard OECD methodology not only standard and non-standard reliefs are 
defined, but also borderline cases. Their classification is presented also. That all 
together presents the research methodology – the analysis framework, where the 
concept of non-standard reliefs is further narrowed. Some other elements of their 
characteristics and structuring are pointed out in tables A1 and A2, concerning 
their technique and resulting effects. After that, the presentation of the current si-
tuation (2011) follows as well as a comparative analysis of non-standard reliefs 
(2006-2011), first for the EU-15 and after that for some of the EU-12, Croatia and 
other countries of the region, underlying the stated differences. The paper ends 
with an additional retrospective review of Croatia concerning the numerous fun-
damental changes in non-standard reliefs.
2 recent analysis of personal income tax reliefs 
In contrast to standard reliefs that are automatically at the disposal of tax payers 
that fulfil certain basic (status) requirements (personal existence, income exist-
ence, marital status, children, old-age, disability and possibly also employment), 
non-standard reliefs are not given automatically. They are based on the concrete 
expenses/expenditures of tax payers (medical, charitable, insurance/pension/sa-
ving, housing ownership, educational…) that the tax system recognizes for the tax 
purposes (in order to diminish the tax due). The stated framework coverage of 
non-standard reliefs is explained in the third chapter in detail.
Most reliefs of that type are also named “interventionist” type reliefs, tax prefe-
rences or tax subsidies. Even many reliefs that are theoretically justified by abi lity 
to pay or so called “subjective net principle”1 have distinguished subsidy cha-
racteristics. The term “tax subsidies”, which implies an analogy between revenues 
forgone (reduced revenues) and subsidy (transfer) allowance at the expenditure 
side of the budget, is related to the currently more widely accepted term “tax ex-
1 Public finance theory distinguishes between the subjective and objective net principle. The former is about 
personal income being reduced by that parts of income that are not freely disposable by a tax payer, bec ause 
they represent unavoidable private expenditures, i.e. income deductions for existence and non-discretionary 
needs. It is about the ability-to-pay principle and the reliefs that enable that principle to be maintained. The 
latter is about deductions from gross income (revenues/receipts) that represent all those expenses that are 
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penditures”. This implies the resulting loss of tax revenues (revenue forgone) cau-
sed by tax reliefs. Non-standard tax reliefs are especially negatively related in that 
respect. Since it was easier for different interest groups – the beneficiaries of such 
reliefs to “hide” such subsidies on the revenue side of the budget (as revenues for-
gone) instead of showing them explicitly on the expenditure side of budget (as 
subsidies), it became the most common practice in a rising number of countries to 
quantitatively specify those tax expenditures, very often precisely as the budget 
supplement. Many structurally justified reliefs (structural measures of ability to 
pay) have subsidy elements and it is very hard (as could be seen from the analysis 
framework in the third chapter) to make a precise distinction between standard 
and non-standard reliefs. That is why the tax expenditure calculations for the de-
veloped countries (OECD, 1996; 2010a; 2010b) do not even pretend to isolate and 
encompass only the “pure” tax expenditures by considering only non-standard tax 
reliefs in the narrowest sense, i.e. those that have a strictly subsidy character of gi-
ving incentives to the most “desirable” activities. Those calculations present more 
or less all tax reliefs in the broadest sense,2 in order to enable a comparison of the 
efficiency of direct expenditures and of tax expenditures,3 but also to avoid tre-
mendous difficulties (often discretionary) in drawing a strict borderline between 
stated categories. 
Some recent reviews of personal income tax reliefs, as well as tax expenditure cal-
culations based on those reliefs (inside the broader tax expenditure calculations) 
for some, mostly OECD member, countries could be found for instance in: Po-
lackova Brixi, Valenduc and Swift, 2004; OECD, 2010a:54-56 and Annex A; and 
OECD, 2010b.
Tax expenditure literature (especially concerning non-standard reliefs only) is 
rare, and especially rare are comparative country experiences (Polackova Brixi, 
Valenduc and Swift, 2004:x). But the government accounting data suggest that, in 
spite of tax reform tendencies from as late as mid-1980s, “the use of tax expendi-
tures is pervasive and growing” in many countries at the beginning of this ce ntury 
(OECD, 2010b:14 and Polockova Brixi, Valenduc and Swift, 2004). It is intere-
sting to point out that even the famous US tax reform of 1986 (Tax Reform Act), 
which was the pioneer of all the already explained reforming tendencies of the 
1980s, including this one about abolishing/reducing especially non-standard tax 
2 Exemptions of some income types (although not all of them), tax allowances, tax credits, lower tax rates 
and tax delays (OECD, 1996:9).
3 One of the typical examples is that of tax reliefs for children. Such reliefs are structural measurements of the 
ability to pay (subjective net principle) and represent a typical example of standard reliefs. On the other hand, 
they could be easily replaced by direct subsidy – child supplement. Although tax reliefs for children are not 
real tax expenditures, their exclusion from the overview of tax expenditures reduces the analysis of possible 
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reliefs, “repealed perhaps 19 of 119 pre-existing tax expenditures”.4 The results of 
other subsequent significant tax law changes in other developed countries are si-
milar – a huge number of tax expenditure (tax reliefs) are still present, and that is 
even confirmed by the trends in the last pre-crisis years, i.e. until 2006/2007 
(OECD, 2010b:52, 269-237)5. The question should be raised why tax reliefs are 
still multiplying and growing. One of the possible answers lies in the already men-
tioned fact that they are easier to introduce and maintain in the law in comparison 
with direct subsidies – real expenditures. It is simply easier to accept the justified 
tax reliefs for specific-merit goods than to pursue an increase in public expenditu-
res for the same purpose. Furthermore, in many developed countries a critical and 
systematic evaluation of the effects of these reliefs has been avoided. This is rela-
ted to understandings of the tax system as constant and persistent in contrast to the 
expenditure side of budget, which is reassessed and revised on a yearly basis. This 
is in turn correlated with the lower transparency of tax expenditures.
In spite of the already mentioned reform tendencies from the eighties, the repeal 
of all targeted tax reliefs, i.e. all tax expenditures has not been generally and offi-
cially proposed for the developed countries (OECD, 2010a:3; OECD, 2010b:24). 
“Assuming in the first instance that there are valid reasons for government invol-
vement (such as market failures or merit goods), there are conditions under which 
tax expenditures are most likely to be successful, or even the best, policy tools to 
achieve their objectives” (OECD, 2010b:24). They are justified if, based on cost-
effectiveness analysis, their benefits continue to outweigh their costs (OECD, 
2010b:3). So, the focusing on standard tax reliefs is proposed, followed by conti-
nued evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of non-standard reliefs (OECD, 2010a:3, 
22). The negative effects of the standard (as well as remaining non-standard) tax 
reliefs on vertical equity, i.e. progressivity could be mitigated/eliminated by the 
substitution of tax allowances by non-wastable tax credits.6
Of course, the stated arguments are not to be seen as an argument capable of un-
dermining the already stated critical arguments concerning the (over)numerous 
and (over)generous non-standard tax allowances. In this respect, “an important 
and timely associated issue is that some OECD member countries have enacted, 
or are considering, fiscal rules that make use of expenditure ceilings” (OECD, 
4 The source of this information (OECD) speaking here about tax expenditures refers to the tax reliefs that 
cause those expenditures. “The largest effect on the number of dollars of tax expenditures (here it is again not 
about number of reliefs, but specific tax expenditures, i.e. revenue lost in monetary terms) in that instance 
likely came from the reduction of marginal tax rates, which reduced the values of the many tax expenditures 
based on exclusions or deductions from taxable income that were not repealed.” (OECD, 2010b:52). 
5 It is very hard to compare countries concerning the number of tax expenditures (tax reliefs and non-standard 
ones of them especially) as well as the amount of tax expenditures (their monetary sum). Based on both the 
criteria the USA, UK and Canada are among the highest in ranking (countries of large numbers and amou-
nts) and for instance Germany and the Netherlands among the lowest ones. But, these results are influenced 
more by specific definitions, classifications and ways of counting reliefs in specific countries than by obje-
ctive criteria and that is why they are very doubtful (OECD, 2010b). It should be mentioned also that the sta-
ted analysis encompasses only ten OECD countries (the data refer to different years from 2004 to even 2008). 
6 This is harder to achieve for different non-standard tax reliefs for saving in the broader sense, which are not 
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2010b:15). Other countries are also considering (the extension of) ceilings, which 
could be given either for singular relief or for pooled reliefs – most of them or all 
of them (the case of Croatia before the repeal of non-standard reliefs). This could 
be seen from the later analysed tables A1 and A2 in appendix.
Tax expenditure measurement for the pre-crisis period (and the period at the very 
beginning of the crisis) for the OECD member countries (2006-2008) showed the 
greatest share of personal income tax expenditures, as usual. This is true for all 
OECD countries except Denmark, France, Mexico and United Kingdom, where 
VAT tax expenditures dominate (OECD, 2010a:50), while in Australia, Canada, 
Korea and Norway the corporate income tax expenditures shares are relatively 
high. In Italy, Spain and United States the personal income tax expenditures have 
the greatest percentage in personal income tax revenues (even around one third). 
“The main categories of tax expenditures (were) reported… for social and family 
policies, supporting home building and improvement, encouraging savings, pro-
moting R&D. Several countries cited the promotion of employment and economic 
development as reasons for certain tax reliefs” (OECD, 2010a:56-57)7. 
A very interesting insight is given by the tax expenditures/reliefs trends data du-
ring the ten years prior to the present analysis. It is about data for OECD cou ntries 
in the period from approximately 1996/1997/1998 to 2006/2007/2008 (OECD, 
2010a:57-59). Although some new reliefs were introduced and old reliefs repea-
led, a generally increasing trend in the use of these reliefs is present, especially 
concerning personal income tax. For the countries reporting detailed data, it could 
be seen that it is just about non-standard reliefs. It seems that the repeal of tax re-
liefs is often associated with a rate reduction (as was the case in Croatia), but the 
introduction of new reliefs is not explicitly associated with a rate increase. Politi-
cal obstacles are often mentioned as one of the major obstacles in the way of re-
pealing tax reliefs (it is about interest groups that would become losers if reliefs 
were abolished). 
An overview of data from particular countries shows a rise in personal income tax 
expenditures in many countries, especially in stated period (OECD, 2010a:63): in 
Australia (especially from 2004), Belgium (from 2005) and France, Spain, 
Switzerland and United States. In contrast, tax reliefs were reduced in the Czech 
Republic (the standard ones in 2006 because of the conversion from tax allowan-
ces into tax credits, as well as non-standard ones in 2008 because of the introduc-
tion of the flat tax),8 Germany (reforms from 2000 and 2008 have reduced some 
employment incentives), Mexico, the Netherlands (reform from 2001), Norway 
(reform from 2004-06) and the Slovak Republic (the famous flat tax reform of 
2004 abolished almost all non-standard reliefs). In Portugal many reliefs were 
7 Supporting home building and improvement as well as encouraging savings represent relevant non-standard 
tax reliefs according to the analysis done in this paper (see the third chapter). 
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abolished in 2005 in order to compensate revenue loss due to the reduction in mar-
ginal rates of personal income tax, but new reliefs were reintroduced in 2006. 
Denmark has also abolished some reliefs.
Since welfare and family reliefs (including also general employment incentives 
for lower income groups, which are those that are rising most) belong to the 
standard reliefs (according to the presented analysis framework in the third chap-
ter) their detailed development will not be elaborated here. The attention will be 
drawn to the rising reliefs for different types of saving, including home ownership 
in the already stated period (OECD, 2010a:66). Such reliefs are widely available 
in OECD countries. This is particularly the case for the preferential treatment of 
home ownership (especially mortgage interest deductions) and retirement plans. 
Some countries (for instance Belgium and Spain) even allow a deduction for 
mortgage capital repayments (sole loan repayments – without the interest) and this 
deduction exists even today (2001 – see table A1 in appendix). Many of these re-
liefs have been in force for more than two decades, while additional non-standard 
reliefs of that type have been introduced/increased in the last decade observed (the 
decade before the research performed in this paper). So, Belgium and Norway in-
creased their housing reliefs (as well as energy-saving investment) and pension re-
liefs. It is interesting that Portugal, after having abolished them in 2005, in 2006 
reintroduced reliefs in the form of tax credits for contributions to retirement sa-
ving plans, pension funds and the purchase of personal computers. In many 
countries the reliefs for work related expenses (commuting expenses, car expen-
ses, expenses for meals at work, computer expenses) increased also.
It is especially interesting to observe personal income tax changes and those of 
them related to tax reliefs, especially non-standard ones, in the EU at the begin-
ning of the economic and financial crisis. In the second half of 2008 and in 2009 
economic policy incentives, especially those provided on the expenditure side of 
budget were followed (although to a lesser extent) by tax policy incentives – those 
given on the revenue side of the budget. Although this was more pronounced for 
the developed countries, and so for the EU-15 also, still some of the EU-12 have 
provided such measures, as it could be seen from the simplified overview in fi- 
gure 1.
At the beginning of the economic crisis, i.e. in the second half of 2008 and in 2009 
(European Commission, 2009:13-19; 2010:30-48) especially pronounced were 
different measures of easing the income tax burden on lower/the lowest incomes9 
by reducing statutory income tax rates, especially for lower incomes (Austria, Fin-
land, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, France10, the Czech Republic and Swe-
9 Even in the same year or next year revenue lost was often compensated by increased tax burden for middle/
higher/highest incomes – for instance by broadened/increased highest income bracket (Austria), abolishment 
of the middle income bracket (Denmark), higher rates for the highest incomes (United Kingdom), introdu-
ction of an additional progressive income tax (Ireland).
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den – not for personal income tax, but for employees’ contributions),  broadening 
of the basic personal relief – personal exemption – zero rated bracket (Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, United Kingdom, Luxembourg11) , 
as well as child reliefs (Austria, Finland, Latvia, Germany12), and finally introdu-
cing/raising working incentives (tax reliefs for employment income) that are 
 typically targeted to lower incomes and often subject to the income earner having 
dependent children (Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Belgium13, Spain – not only for personal income tax but also for emplo-
yers’ contributions). Some countries decided to facilitate tax payments by redu-
cing or delaying withholding tax (Belgium, Denmark). Spain, similarly, decided 
to lower penalty interest for delay in tax payment and extend the deadline for con-
tributions to tax-privileged housing schemes and enable advanced claim of own 
housing mortgage tax deduction through monthly withholding tax payments. 
Greece introduced, instead of the above measures, a special negative tax, i.e. a 
special benefit to unemployed persons or low-income pensioners who already had 
contracted a mortgage loan. 
figure 1
Income tax reduction measures at the beginning of the economic crisis
Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, 





























Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, 




Source: Authors, according to European Commission (2009:13-19;2010:30-48).
Tax reduction measures related to non-standard reliefs did not have the same im-
portance as other measures. More significant fiscal impact was achieved by stan-
dard reliefs. On the other hand, many tax incentives were provided through corpo-
rate income tax or related part of personal income tax – that one concerning busi-
ness income (which is out of scope of this analysis). Still, relatively numerous in-
creases of these reliefs were registered (European Commission, 2009:13-19; 
2010:30-48). Austria increased commuter tax credit and introduced the tax 
11 Switchover from tax allowance to the tax credit.
12 Germany introduced a negative tax on a one time basis for children (“Kinderbonus”) as well.
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deductibility of certain donations. Bulgaria introduced mortgage interest deduc-
tion for young families. Italy introduced tax incentives for purchases of household 
appliances and furniture, decided to cap the interest rate for variable-rate mortga-
ges and reimburse the difference to the banks through tax credits, as well as to of-
fer postponement until 2011 of the measures supporting housing renovation, i.e. 
the personal income tax credit on renovation expenses. Finland increased the pen-
sion income allowances in state and municipal income taxation as well as the tax 
credit for paid household work. Germany increased the personal income tax cre-
dit for services supplied by self-employed persons for household repairs. Luxem-
bourg increased the deduction ceiling for the one-off premium paid as part of a 
tempo rary life insurance policy as well as the deductibility ceiling for interest paid 
on a housing credit. The Netherlands increased the ceiling for the deduction of an-
nuity premiums related to private pensions. Portugal increased the deductions 
from taxable income related to education, health, dwelling and nursing home ex-
penses and also introduced tax allowance for commuting expenses. Romania in-
creased the level of deductibility of voluntary health insurance and threshold of 
deduction for employees’ contribution to optional pension schemes.14 Sweden in-
troduced a tax credit for renovations, conversions and building maintenance for 
households. Greece supplemented its non-standard mortgage interest relief with 
special benefits for unemployed and low-income pensioners, as already explained. 
Denmark decided not to stimulate pension saving through the usual non-standard 
relief for pension contributions indeed, but then decided to stimulate its withdra-
wal by preferential tax treatment. It could be concluded that the rise of non-stan-
dard reliefs in the EU refers mostly to home ownership investments (to boost con-
struction and consumption), followed by retirement saving.
Yet at the very beginning of the crisis, some countries in unfavourable fiscal posi-
tions were not able to implement personal income tax reductions (at all). On the 
contrary, they mostly passed different measures to increase the burden of personal 
income tax, as well as other taxes. Among them, from the EU-15 especially Gree-
ce, but also Ireland could be pointed out. Ireland introduced, among other measu-
res, an additional personal income tax similar to the Croatian “crisis tax”. Among 
the EU-12 Lithuania was forced to reduce basic personal reliefs already in the se-
cond half of 2009. Estonia has not reacted by raising the tax burden indeed, but 
has postponed the planned reduction in personal income tax rate as well as the in-
crease in basic personal relief. 
Already at the beginning of 2010 a gradual halt to the dominant trend in income 
tax reduction was observed. Although some countries still proceeded with the de-
scribed reduction measures (especially Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary and 
14 Romania has also increased the cap for the deductibility for voluntary pension and health contributions from 
corporate and personal income of employers as well as has carried out some other tax base narrowing mea-
sures. They were mostly connected with capital gains incentives (exemptions for trading securities on Roma-
nian stock exchange and for non-residents). Romania reduced dividend tax rates for non-residents also. In the 
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Slovenia), more and more countries raised their tax burden, especially for the hi-
ghest incomes (European Commission, 2010:30-48). Estonia, which deferred the 
planned tax disburdening (tax rate cut, personal allowance increase), cancelled the 
additional allowance for the first child. Greece additionally burdened high inco-
mes as well increasing the entire personal income tax burden in a numerous ways. 
France introduced a 50% tax on bonuses exceeding 27,500 euro paid in 2009 by 
financial institutions to their traders. Portugal introduced a special 60% personal 
income tax rate for an unjustified increase in wealth of over 100,000 euro15 and 
started to include golden handshakes to managers and board members in the tax 
base. Hungary had included up to that time non-taxable incomes and even emplo-
yer’s contributions in the tax base. Latvia had increased the personal income tax 
rate, introduced capital income, dividend and interest taxation, abolished emplo-
yer bonuses exemption from personal income tax and social security contributions 
as well as including up to that time non-taxable employment in comes in the tax 
base. Slovenia imposed a new additional tax at the rate of 49% on the income of 
management in companies receiving state aid. Spain gradually diminished em-
ployment tax credit for high incomes. The United Kingdom introduced an additio-
nal marginal personal income tax rate of 50% for highest incomes, restricted per-
sonal allowances for high incomes, and also raised contributions of employees, 
employers and the self-employed (European Commission, 2009:19).
Among measures concerning non-standard reliefs as well as borderline cases 
between standard and non-standard reliefs at the beginning of 2010 (European 
Commission, 2010:30-48) the following could be highlighted: increase in the tax 
credit for paid household work and increase of the income employment deduction, 
as well increases in pension allowances in state and local income taxes in Finland, 
increased deductibility (full deduction) of payments for health and nursing care 
insurance in Germany, substantial changes of existing tax reliefs for savings (pri-
vate pension, insurance and investment funds) and lowering of tax relief for pen-
sion contributions for high incomes in United Kingdom (European Commission, 
2009:19).
The broader synthesis of the beginning of 2010 in comparison with 2009 (as well 
as end of the 2008) taking into account all presented measures (figure 1), as well 
as inclusion of other income types (European Commission, 2010:28) already indi-
cates a notable trend reversal. While in 2009 measures of income tax burden re-
duction were considerably predominant (concerning tax rates as well as tax 
base)16, in 2010 an almost equal number of countries reduced as raised this tax 
burden. Considering the tax raising technique used, the number of countries ap-
plying different measures of base broadening (among them those related to non-
standard reliefs to a lesser extent) is almost the same as those applying rate incre-
ases.
15 Later (in 2011 and in 2012) it introduced additional surtaxes for high incomes also. 
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The same trend was further developed in the remaining part of 2010, as well as in 
the first half of 2011 (European Commission, 2011:32), as can be seen from the ta-
ble 1.
table 1
Personal income tax changes in the EU in 2010 and in the first half of 2011
statutory rates base (or special regimes)
Increase Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Spain, France, Ireland, Latvia, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, UK
Decrease Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Netherlands
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Sweden
Source: European Commission (2011:32).
Considerable changes in personal income tax in 2010 and in the first half of 2011 
are visible. They (compared to the previous data) show a further increase in the 
number of countries that increase personal income tax burden in mid and at the 
end of 2010 as well as in the first half of 2011. According to table 1, although  
some countries are still proceeding with the previous decade’s trend of income tax 
decrease (which intensified especially at the beginning of the economic crisis), 
most of the countries have increased the personal income tax burden, especially 
by different base-broadening measures.17 The increase of the tax burden in 
Denmark in 2011 is connected with its previous decrease in 2010. The countries 
that in that period still decreased the income tax burden (often by providing work 
incentives) have made up for the resulting revenue loss by shifting the tax burden 
to other sources (mostly consumption).
One of the most prominent newest reform tendencies in personal income tax, in 
contrast to the “classical” reform tendencies set as late as the mid 1980s, is a rise 
in progressivity. This is a result of the renewed and rising interest in the redistri-
butive effects of the tax system. This is one of the rare measures that can increase 
both the tax revenues and the vertical equity of the tax system. This tendency was 
anticipated by some measures mentioned already for the beginning of 2010 and 
even earlier. The considerable increase in progressivity could be noticed in some 
EU member countries (European Commission, 2011:33). “France increased the 
highest marginal tax rates as well as tax rates on capital income. Spain introduced 
two additional top personal income tax brackets of 46% and 47%, and increased 
tax rates on capital income from savings in 2010. In the United Kingdom, perso-
nal income tax has been made more progressive, with higher tax allowances and 
an additional top rate of 50% – 10 percentage points higher than the previous ma-
ximum” and a ceiling has been introduced for the use of the personal exemption. 
17 However, it is logically expected and usual in such a type of analysis (table 1) to classify more countries 
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“Greece and Portugal both introduced a new 45% top rate.” Latvia and Luxem-
bourg both increased the top rates. In Ireland the top marginal rate was increased 
to 52% for employees and is applied earlier (a lower threshold for the highest in-
come bracket). Romania could be added to the listed number of countries, since 
progressivity is enhanced here by including also capital gains and interest on bank 
deposits in the income tax base (taxed, as is known, by the flat rate).18
In the period analyzed (2010 and 2011) some measures of non-standard relief re-
duction could be observed (European Commission, 2011:33-34). In Denmark, for 
instance, deductions (tax allowances) for work-related expenses (employment in-
come) and interest expenses were reduced. That compensated, according to the 
classical reform recommendations, for the revenue loss resulting from the income 
tax rate reduction. France has, also according to the usual recommendations, re-
placed a tax allowance for mortgage interest with more precisely targeted loan 
subsidies. The tax base has considerable broadened in Latvia also. 
It is obvious that the stated tax changes overviews in the times of economic crisis 
are comprehensive, encompassing all measures that resulted in personal income 
tax increase and decrease. Similarly, within the base changes, all different broade-
ning/narrowing measures are encompassed, without special emphasis on non-
standard tax reliefs, which are blamed as being the most inefficient and most ine-
quitable as well as the main cause of complexity in the tax system and revenue 
loss. The presented review ends with the data for the middle of 2011, although 
some important measures happened (or were announced) by the end of that year. 
So, the comparative analysis in the remaining part of this paper will be focused 
exclusively on non-standard reliefs by comparing the pre-crisis period (end of the 
2006) with the last available data (end of the 2011).
3 framework for non-standard relief analysis 
As already pointed out in chapter 2, non-standard reliefs, in contrast to standard 
reliefs, are not acquired automatically (depending on status), but they depend on 
the documentarily proven concrete (in general non-discretionary) expenses/in-
vestments of the tax payer subject to the relief. Typical non-standard reliefs en-
compass for instance different voluntary (social security) contributions, i.e. insu-
rance premiums, charitable contributions, medical expenses (voluntary medical 
insurance premiums/contributions are already mentioned as part of the first item) 
and different interest payments (for loans where tax payers have borrowed for dif-
ferent investment purposes – the most typical example are mortgage interest).
18 Only two countries decreased progressivity in personal income tax in 2010 and in the first half of 2011 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011:33). Hungary introduced a flat tax relatively late (in 2011). The flat tax rate amo-
unts to 16%, and that almost halved the highest marginal rates. Denmark lowered highest marginal personal 
income tax rate (from 63.0% to 56.1%). Furthermore, two countries made significant steps in continuing dual 
income tax trends. Austria, which already has had considerable dual income tax elements, finally applied a 
dual income tax in 2011. It started to tax financial capital gains regardless of their duration at the same flat rate 
of 25% at which dividends, interests and other capital gains are taxed. That broadened the tax base. Portugal 
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Borderline cases19 encompass child care expenses, household expenses, contribu-
tions for compulsory social security contributions, and eventually (other lump-
sum) work-related expenses (expenses related with employment). Such reliefs are 
mostly considered standard ones, so they are treated in same way in this paper 
(they are not encompassed by the analysis performed in the remaining part of the 
paper).20 Reliefs for child care and household expenses are some sort of reliefs for 
employed spouse, because they are related to its specific status (employment) and 
specific family situation (children and their number). That is why they could be re-
garded as standard reliefs. Since alimony is the result of the existence of child(ren), 
as well as specific (non)marital status, deduction in this case could be considered 
standard relief also. Employment relationship presents a specific status also, 
where some costs (for instance compulsory social security contributions) are in-
curred automatically. The same is true for different lump-sum reliefs for em-
ployment (work-related expenses) as well as for reliefs that present a combination 
of employment income reliefs (“status”) and family situation (children) as is the 
case with earned income tax credit. Finally, commuting costs are considered non-
standard reliefs, although they are caused by employment location (possibility to 
move, other discretionary elements of those costs).
Furthermore, deductions of costs that are related to the acquiring of income are 
not to be treated as reliefs, since this is about the already explained objective net 
principle21. The only exception from this principle in the analysis refers to the 
commuting expenses of employees. The reasons are already mentioned, i.e. there 
exist different ways in avoiding those costs and they vary depending on personal 
circumstances (residence location). Regarding other work-related expenses of 
employees, their reliefs are treated depending whether they are given on lump-
sum bases (standard reliefs) or tare based on specified (partly discretional) costs, 
i.e. extraordinary high costs (non-standard reliefs). The former relief is not given 
very often and that is why it is classified under “other costs”. 
The second exception is interest payments encompassed in this analysis. They are 
cost related to the capital income, which is generated from the loan taken. The 
most interesting relief in that sense is mortgage interest relief, which is widely 
used. Tax theory requires the resulting income – imputed rent from owner occu-
pied housing to be taxed also. The non-taxation of that sort of income in most 
countries contradicts the objective net principle. Since this income is not taxed in 
general, there is no ground for deduction of costs in this case. As the result, such 
reliefs are classified as non-standard. For other interest payments, where such 
19 Borderline cases and related problems are analyzed in more detail in: Blažić (2006:132-135, 137-141, 146-
215), as well as Blažić and Drezgić (2012:67-68).
20 So, OECD, for instance, in its regular yearly publication “Taxing Wages” by calculating the tax burden of 
the average worker (which is calculated taking into account standard reliefs only) includes the relief for com-
pulsory social security contributions also (considering it the standard relief).
21 Also, this analysis does not encompass specific reliefs given to personal income tax payers that are entre-
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 capital income is taxed (securities, for example), such classification is less justi-
fied, but it could still be argued that such costs are not necessary and unavoidable.
The analytical framework for the definition and classification of different reliefs is 
based in general, as well as in this analysis, on the classical income concept.22 In 
the end, it is necessary to refer also to this theoretical problem: is the adequate ba-
seline for defining tax reliefs that of income of the consumption type (for instance 
OECD, 2010:17, 45; Caroll, Joulfaian and Mackie, 2011)?23 Some countries pro-
vide reliefs for some saving/investment types also. These reliefs (together with 
already mentioned reliefs for compulsory and voluntary retirement saving and life 
insurance) could not be considered tax reliefs at all, if the consumption concept in 
its genuine (standard) form (savings adjusted income tax) is taken as the ade quate 
tax base concept. Starting from the income concept, on the contrary, the tax 
exemptions of some capital incomes, which are very frequent, especially in the 
EU-12 and countries of the region, should be regarded as tax reliefs. But they are 
reliefs in the broader sense, as already mentioned. This analysis encompasses non-
standard reliefs only, i.e. reliefs in the narrower sense (defined as specific nondi-
scretionary expenses). So the non-taxation of capital income represents privileged 
tax treatment and departure from the classical income concept and results in the 
tax base narrowing. But this privileged treatment does not represent non-standard 
reliefs in the narrower sense and is consequently not included in the further 
analysis. 
According to the stated theoretical framework the comparative analysis encom-
passes the following non-standard reliefs:
 – relief for voluntary pension insurance contributions, regardless whether they 
are paid to private or public insurance funds,
 – relief for life insurance premiums, 
 – relief for medical expenses, including also voluntary medical insurance con-
tributions,
 – relief for commuting and moving expenses,
 – relief for charitable contributions,
 – relief for interest payments,
22 Classical income concept is so called comprehensive or synthetic income, which is also called “Schanz-
Haig-Simons (S-H-S) income”, denoting the founders of that concept. Income is accrual of economic power 
in some period. It is formed by all possible sorts of income (labour income, capital income, transfers). Consi-
dering its use, it consists of consumption and increase in net worth (saving). The opposite concept – so called 
“consumption concept” has two forms. The first one is the genuine (standard) one, where the base is S-H-S 
income minus saving (savings adjusted income tax), i.e. the tax base is consumption. The derivative of that 
model – so called “alternative model” is interest-adjusted income tax, meaning that all capital income (inte-
rest in the broader sense) is deductible from the S-H-S base. If transfers are ignored, this form of tax is sim-
ply reduced to labour income tax.
23 The stated problem as well as other problems of defining a real “benchmark” for non-standard tax reliefs 
and related defining and measuring of tax expenditures, as already pointed out in previous chapter, make a tax 
expenditure comparison among countries almost impossible, i.e. very conditional (OECD, 1996; 2010a:40-53 
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 – other reliefs for different expenses (for instance education, investments/sa-
ving).
The current (end-2011) non-standard reliefs are compared to end-2006 reliefs in 
order to perceive changes made over the last five years. The analysis is based on 
the standard international tax legislation on-line data of the International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The latest (end-2011) data of their “Tax Rese-
arch Platform” (IBFD, 2012) are compared to the already performed non-standard 
reliefs overview for the countries in question for 2006 (Blažić, 2006:153-154, 
156). The 2006 analysis was done based on the methodologically identical IBFD 
Edition at that time European Tax Handbook published on CD ROM (IBFD, 
2006).
Although the above stated publications both follow the strict relief classification 
based on their technique (tax allowances/exemptions/deductions in contrast to tax 
credits), the detailed description of the reliefs depends on the particular country 
reporter. Consequently, it often happens that some reliefs are not described in de-
tail or even, in a case of a numerous reliefs, the country reporter restricts his report 
to the “most important ones” (as for instance in the case of France)24. The stated 
problem influences both the scope and the changes detected in the already existing 
reliefs25. 
Since the analysis is about the influence of the economic crisis on tax reliefs, it is 
realistic to assume that the newest data (end 2011) are still “premature” concer-
ning the (possibly too slow) reaction of the tax legislation to the crisis/“post-cri-
sis?” period as well as the extension of crisis in many countries. The greater in-
fluence of the base broadening demands could be seen maybe as late as 2012 or 
even 2013. Furthermore, the presented income tax trends data from the previous 
chapter should also be taken into account. Namely, some “set off” of reliefs is po-
ssible, i.e. the increase of non-standard reliefs from the beginning of the crisis 
could be compensated by their later (insufficient) reduction. However, that is the 
positive element of this analysis, which should give some kind of (up to date) re-
sult/resume of the conducted non-standard tax relief measures influenced by the 
economic crisis.
24 In the cases where the reporter for particular country mentions that, this is also noticed in the comparative 
tables A1 and A2 in appendix. But there is a reasonable suspicion that not all of the reporters emphasize this, 
so some of the reliefs are omitted in that way. This could make a comparison between the years stated for the 
country in question harder, especially if the reporter is changed in the meantime. The changes of reporters for 
different countries also imply the problem of data being only differently presented (for instance shortened). 
That could lead to the wrong impression that the reliefs have been simplified/changed. 
25 One of the potential problems is that tables A1 and A2 in appendix do not entail specific quantitative amo-
unts of reliefs. This is not possible, since most countries’ data do not entail such data. Even where such data 
are present, it would be hard to find out whether the rise in these amounts is a result of an effective rise in 
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The comparative analysis in this paper (tables A1 and A2 in appendix) presents all 
the relevant relief elements in as great detail as possible. That is why additional re-
marks besides tax allowance (TA) and tax credit (TC) remarks are given. So, F de-
notes full deduction (allowance), i.e. that all the relevant costs/expenditures 
subject to relief are deducted in full from the tax base. Full tax credit is, of course, 
not possible (the tax system would make up for all those expenses to the tax pa-
yer). That is why a tax credit is provided as partial (P), i.e. as part of the relevant 
expenses. Such partial provision exists very often for the tax allowances also (par-
tial tax allowance – PTA). PTA in contrast to PTC (partial tax credit) already im-
plies certain limitation of tax allowance, especially when the tax allowance was 
previously full (FTA). Such limitation is often made by defining fixed tax allo-
wances (FXTA) and fixed tax credits (FXTC), which are more appropriate concer-
ning fiscal effects. FXTA and FXTC are usually used for standard tax reliefs, espe-
cially personal/family exemptions, but they occur also for non-standard reliefs, 
especially when such reliefs are intended to be provided on a lump-sum basis and 
not bound to specific quantitative amounts of cost. It can be seen that this is alre-
ady about borderline cases.
It has already been pointed out that the TCs are mostly partial (PTC), being provi-
ded as partial – share (percentage) of the costs. However, when percentage (%) is 
explicitly given in tables, it denotes a situation in which the TC is not a share (per-
centage) of the specific expense, but of the tax payer’s personal income (I%). If 
TC is higher than this income, the difference is mostly lost, i.e. not refunded to the 
tax payer as the negative tax. The term “non-wastable” denotes the opposite and 
rarer situation in which the TC is not wasted if it is higher than the tax due. The 
difference is paid out to the taxpayer as a transfer (negative tax). 
Due to fiscal and other reasons, tax reliefs often have an upper limit (ceiling – C). 
It is mostly stated in an absolute amount, meaning that no relief is allowed after 
that amount. It is possible for a ceiling not to be given in absolute amount, but as 
income percentage (I%). 
It is also possible for reliefs not only to be expressed as part (percentage) of inco-
me (I%), but to be income related (IR). This means that with the rise of income the 
relief decreases (inverse proportionality). Such relation is caused by social effects 
and is very frequent recently (standard allowances – personal exemption (basic 
tax allowance) at the flat tax for instance). Very similar is the situation of gradual 
phasing out (p.o.) of relief with the income rise.
4 comparative analysis of non-standard reliefs in the eu-15 
(2006-2011)
Table A1 in appendix presents the comparison of current non-standard tax reliefs’ 
situation (end-2011) with the situation from the end of 2006 for the EU-15. All the 
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letters, new reliefs are bolded and relief modifications are shaded (inside them 
their new elements are bolded again).26 
The insight into the current situation (2011) shows that developed tax systems still 
use a broad array of non-standard reliefs. Almost all the countries provide relief 
for voluntary pension contributions/premiums, while fewer of them provide relief 
for life insurance premiums. There is no country that does not provide even one of 
these reliefs. When both are provided, the technique is the same (with the excep-
tion of Italy). Tax allowance is the predominant form of these reliefs, which is lo-
gical (concerning the analogy of voluntary pension contributions with the com-
pulsory ones and the similarity of life insurance with the former). Only Belgium 
and partially Italy and Portugal (which turned to tax credits completely) provide 
these two reliefs as tax credits. These reliefs are in general limited by a ceiling in 
order to prevent fiscal outflow and mitigate their negative vertical equity effects.
Most of the countries have reliefs for medical expenses. These are characterized 
not by the upper threshold – ceiling, but by the lower threshold. This threshold is 
either explicitly stated or taken into account by being given only for high medical 
costs. Some countries (Greece, Italy and Portugal) provide that relief as a tax cre-
dit, which is not in accordance with ability to pay principle, but reflects its social 
character. Although theory points out the possibility of substituting the relief for 
voluntary health insurance for the relief for medical expenses, some countries pro-
vide both reliefs.
A lot of countries provide relief for commuting expenses. The approval of such re-
lief or its amount often depends on the distance. Instead of that relief France pro-
vides moving expenses relief, while Sweden and Germany provide both reliefs. In 
general these reliefs are in the form of tax allowances, which is logical since they 
are one of the costs of acquiring income (objective net principle). 
The majority of countries allow relief for charitable contributions, which could be 
claimed to be the most justified (see the sixth chapter). Most of the countries have 
accepted the fact that this relief is more efficient in the form of a tax allowance. In 
contrast, Portugal, of course, as well as Spain and France provide that relief in the 
form of a tax credit. 
All of the countries have relief for interest payments, which could be explained by 
the objective net principle, as already stated. Most of countries give it as a tax al-
lowance, and five as a tax credit, which is not in accordance with the objective net 
principle. This implies the social goals of the most used of those reliefs – this one 
for mortgage interest.
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Among other reliefs, the relief for educational expenses, work-related expenses 
(employment expenses) as well as reliefs for different saving/investment forms (in 
general as tax allowances) could be pointed out.27 
The analysis of changes of non-standard tax reliefs in the 2006-2011 period is ex-
pected to reflect the base broadening demands (repeal/reduction of reliefs), which 
have lately also been especially emphasized. But the comparison of the 2006 and 
the 2011 figures reveals no significant base broadening trend based on the signifi-
cant number of repealed reliefs. Moreover, the number of newly introduced reliefs 
outweighs the number of those repealed. This, however, does not imply changes 
in the quantitative amounts of reliefs of the same size in both stated directions, 
which are not encompassed by the analysis (as already stated in the second chap-
ter). It is possible that the stated limitations in the third chapter still imply a strong 
influence of the trends from the beginning of the crisis (base narrowing through 
non-standard reliefs) and relatively weak trends from the end of the crisis (base 
broadening) also. The modifications in reliefs (shaded areas) imply their reduc-
tions (base broadening), which is visible from, for instance, the introduction of an 
upper limit (ceiling) or fixed tax allowance instead of (part of) the real expenses, 
but there are some modifications in the opposite direction. Modifications are nei-
ther numerous nor all directed towards base broadening, which is again, in accor-
dance with the review of the trends in the second chapter.
Nevertheless, even this limited analysis has proven the already known fact, poin-
ted out in the second chapter also, that once introduced, tax reliefs are hard to re-
peal.28 This is true regardless of the already presented criticisms,29 even under the 
rising pressure of fiscal consolidation due to the economic and financial crisis. 
5 comparative analysis of non-standard reliefs in some eu-12 
and countries of the region (2006-2011)
It is much easier to analyse the non-standard tax reliefs in the EU-12 (not inclu-
ding the Baltic states, Malta and Cyprus) and countries of the region (table A2 in 
appendix). The reason is very simple – these reliefs are traditionally not develo-
ped in these countries, especially in those from our region. This is the result of per-
sonal income tax not having been developed in these countries. Ex-socialist 
countries did not have synthetic/comprehensive personal income tax, but mostly 
schedular taxation – taxation of some income types that implicitly excluded/signi-
27 Such tax allowances are somehow identical to the non-taxation of some capital income. This is excluded 
from the analysis, as already explained in the previous chapter. 
28 Political obstacles are often stated as the main obstacle for tax reliefs’ abolishment. It is about interest gro-
ups – reliefs beneficiaries that give strong resistance to their abolishment.
29 The already stated OECD member countries analysis came to the similar conclusion, pointing out that reliefs 
for saving/investment in real estate (mortgage interest) as well as pension saving have not only persisted for 
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ficantly restricted non-standard reliefs.30 Some of these countries have retained 
such taxation until recently (for instance Bosnia and Herzegovina until 2008), 
while some countries apply classical comprehensive income tax for high incomes 
only (for instance Serbia). 
Non-standard reliefs are considerably less present in this group of countries than 
in the former group. Based on current data (2011), it is obvious that Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia and recently Hungary, as well as Croatia 
(with the exception of charitable contributions) have completely accepted the ne-
gative attitude toward non-standard reliefs (their inefficiency and inequity). A 
question could be raised about why non-standard reliefs do not exist in these 
countries. Is it the result of the traditionally undeveloped tax (and economic) sy-
stems of these countries (which could be supported by the 2006 data in table A2)? 
Or does it mean that these countries (in contrast to the more developed EU-15 
countries) have accepted contemporary tax policy recommendations (against 
 those reliefs) more consistently? It is obvious that both of the causes have played 
a significant role, since they are complementary. Concerning the latter, the intro-
duction of a flat tax in these countries should be mentioned (in contrast to the EU-
15). It is well known that the classical flat tax model excludes non-standard reliefs 
(although its practical implementation has different deviations). So, the countries 
that in principle do not have non-standard reliefs (with the exception of Slovenia 
and Croatia) are flat tax countries also (Serbia, however, introduced a flat tax in 
2003, but abandoned it in 2007). Albania is the only flat tax country that still re-
cently introduced some of those reliefs. As already pointed out, Croatia (with the 
exception of charitable contributions) and Slovenia have abolished those reliefs 
without having introduced a flat tax.
The rest of the analysis concentrates on the remaining countries that provide non-
standard reliefs and their comparison with the EU-15. It seems that, in comparison 
with the EU-15, employment income is mostly discriminated against, since these 
countries provide neither commuting expenses relief nor other relief for concrete, 
absolutely work-related expenses. Still, some progress concerning lump sum re-
lief for work-related expenses (employment income) should be emphasized (this 
relief is not encompassed with the research since it is considered the standard 
relief).31 
30 Taxation of “Summed income of individuals” in the former Yugoslavia could be regarded as an exce ption 
only conditionally, because such comprehensive/synthetic taxation, which included non-standard reliefs also, 
was applied only to high incomes (higher than three times the average wage). A similar system is now in 
effect in Serbia.
31 Tax approved lump sum work-related expenses (tax reliefs for employment) did not exist in these coun-
tries in 2006 (Blažić, 2006:144-146). In the meantime Hungary, Poland and Romania have introduced them 
and still (2011) have them, while Slovakia provides basic personal relief (exemption/tax allowance) only 
for employment income and business income as well as tax credit for children only for employment income 
above a certain threshold (IBFD, 2012). The Czech Republic plans to introduce tax credits for employment 
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As with the EU-15, these countries in principle provide relief for pension insu-
rance contributions/premiums, but provide the relief for life insurance premiums 
much more rarely. Almost all countries provide relief for charitable contributions 
and slightly fewer of them provide relief for medical expenses.32 Around half of 
these countries (that provide non-standard reliefs) also provide relief for interest 
payments, especially for mortgage interest. It is logical that this relief is not pro-
vided for other investment forms, since their capital incomes are mostly not taxed 
at all. Among other reliefs, the relief for students could be pointed out.
All the countries use tax allowances that are limited in principle, mostly because 
of fiscal but also because of vertical equity considerations.
The 2006-2011 data comparison reveals that, in contrast to the EU-15, the number 
of reliefs abolished considerably exceeds the number newly introduced. Only Al-
bania (which previously had had a completely undeveloped system of personal in-
come tax reliefs) and Bulgaria went in the opposite direction. The former introdu-
ced new reliefs and the latter maintained all previous reliefs and introduced one 
new relief. The remaining countries, with Croatia in the forefront, have mostly 
abolished tax reliefs (in Hungary partially substituted for by cash transfers). Ac-
cordingly, there are more countries without non-standard reliefs now (in 2011) 
than in 2006, when only Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia belon-
ged to that group. This could be explained by the already mentioned flat tax intro-
duction, but not entirely. Furthermore, it is obvious that not only have these 
countries decided to follow modern tax policy recommendations, but that interest 
group resistance in these countries is weaker, giving them more manoeuvring 
 space. A question could be raised as to whether the repeal of these reliefs is based 
on detailed cost-effectiveness analyses (including equity issues also) or whether it 
is merely the result of efforts at fiscal consolidation, which are accompanied by re-
venue-neutralizing rate lowering. But it is obvious that such a dilemma is obso lete 
if not irrelevant (OECD, 2010a).
6 non-standard reliefs in croatia
The Croatian situation concerning non-standard tax reliefs is characterized by re-
peated radical changes. Instead of a detailed analysis of the particular reliefs, 
especially concerning their cost-effectiveness analysis as well as analysis of their 
other aspects, the “global” approach has been implemented in principle. From the 
implementation of a modern income tax system in Croatia in 1994, non-standard 
reliefs in the country have passed through an interesting development path, which 
is characterized by a vicious circle of extreme solutions. It started with their non-
existence inside the personal income tax through the introduction of almost all of 
them and finished with the abolishment of almost all of existing reliefs (except 
32 It is interesting that Hungary, which completely abolished non-standard reliefs, still substituted cash tran-
sfers for tax credits (for voluntary contributions/premiums of pension, life and health insurance). This indi-
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that for charitable contributions). This is presented in detail in the remaining part 
of this chapter.
As is known, the 1994 personal (and corporate) income tax reform was con-
sumption based. It was characterized by “interest-adjusted personal (and corpo-
rate) income tax” (Rose and Wenger, 1992).33 In accordance with consumption ba-
sed taxation (as well as tax reform demands from the eighties for developed 
countries that had spread into the transition countries also), a strong attitude 
against non-standard reliefs was present. This was completely implemented in the 
Croatian personal income tax system.
But after a couple of years the first relief in the form of tax allowance (in the form 
of already existing standard tax reliefs in Croatia) for charitable contributions in 
art and culture, and later in sport, was introduced. The fragmentary introduction of 
this, probably mostly justified34 relief, was not brought by tax legislation, but by 
specific activities’ legislation. The partial introduction of this relief was obviously 
not motivated by criteria of efficiency35, but by the influence and strength of other 
elements that initiated the stated legislative changes. Such fragmentation led to 
the tax discrimination of other forms and (possible) recipients of charitable contri-
butions (especially humanitarian, scientific and educational institutions). 
33 In contrast to this “alternative model”, the “standard” model of consumption concept includes the “savi-
ngs adjusted personal income tax” at individual level, followed by the “cash-flow tax” at the corporate level.
34 Although this is the relief in the narrowest sense, i.e. “interventionist” type relief, which is not relief justi-
fied by objective or subjective net principle (ability to pay principle), there are still additional equity reasons 
in favour of the right to this relief. Such expenses are justified personal expenses (Dodge, 1989:122-123), i.e. 
expenses that present inability to contribute to the redistributive function of the state. To the group of such 
expenses not only those expenses that represent existence and nondiscretionary expenses could be classified, 
but also those expenses that are part of the non-government social redistribution scheme that has the priority 
in comparison to the government ones. This other reason is related right to the charitable contributions and 
follows from the first one, which makes the argument in favour of this relief especially strong (Dodge, 1989a, 
125-126). The ability to pay principle arises, namely, from the understanding of government as the instru-
ment of wealth redistribution and the provision of public good. That is why this relief could be advocated 
for its redistributive effects and provision public goods, regardless of the amounts being part of the ability to 
pay, its voluntary element and existence needs. The next argument in favour of this relief is so called “needs 
principle” (“Bedarfsprinzip”) (for instance Tipke, 1993:361-417, 713-742) and the equity argument under-
stood as “reward”, but also “incentive” for socially desirable forms of consumption (for instance Kiesling, 
1992:119; Mijatović, 2007:297). This is already related to the effectiveness of this relief, i.e. it is effective if 
the desirable activity incentive effect is realized at the minimum possible cost (revenue lost, i.e. tax expen-
ditures). Empirical researches imply the efficiency of that relief related to its elasticity, although they are not 
completely unambiguous (Blažić, 2006:150-151), which implies the necessity of specific cost-effectiveness 
analyses for each country and situation (Blažić, 2000). Among other arguments those related to democrati-
zation and pluralist society strengthening through decentralization and some sort of competition in financing 
different activities could be pointed out. It is mostly not about pure public goods, but merit goods and there-
fore it is desirable for the budget to be released from such expenditures (that are otherwise financed through 
charitable contributions). Since such goods could not be adequately placed through the market, private finan-
cing through charitable contributions is the optimal “in-between mechanism”. Of course, a question could be 
raised about the adequacy of the location of such goods through private sector decisions. That is why public 
sector control is necessary and it is performed properly by shaping and targeting this relief (see footnote 36).
35 The incentive effect for some other charitable contributions – for instance humanitarian ones (or maybe sci-
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Of course, the chosen solution was in contrast to the usual situation in contempo-
rary tax systems, where relief for such charitable contributions is general.36
Tax reform from 2001 was formally a departure from the consumption concept in 
the direction of the income concept.37 Although this should not have automati cally 
implied a positive attitude towards reliefs, more and more reliefs were gradually 
included. This was influenced not only by the tax systems of the EU-15 (and other 
developed countries), but also by the tax systems of some of the EU-12. Further-
more, the already stated arguments in favour of particular non-standard reliefs 
could not be avoided. Some of them enable the fulfilment of the subjective net 
principle (ability to pay principle), but even the objective net principle. This justi-
fies them from the aspect of equity (this is especially true for the relief for medi-
cal expenses and in a broader sense the relief for the voluntary health insurance) 
as well as efficiency (this is especially true for the already analysed relief for cha-
ritable contributions).38 Finally, the reasons for the reliefs’ introduction were the 
influences of different interest groups, which used EU tax practice as strong argu-
ment. 
So, it is no wonder that these reliefs were introduced without significant cost- 
effectiveness analyses or analysis of horizontal and vertical equity or fiscal and 
tax compliance effects.39 The following reliefs were thus introduced: tax allowan-
ces for other charitable contributions, life insurance premiums, additional and vo-
luntary health and pension insurance premiums, other medical expenses, buying 
or building a first home, home maintenance, mortgage interest and 50% of rental 
fees. The stated reliefs are presented in table A2 in appendix according to the non-
standard reliefs synthesis for EU countries.40 
A look at table A2 reveals that Croatia has applied all basic types of non-standard 
reliefs, i.e. that in comparison with the EU-15 only some non-standard reliefs 
were “missing” – for instance relief for commuting expenses as well as some 
“other” expenses like these for moving expenses, education, home work, etc.
Concerning the stated “generous” application of reliefs, which started to show 
strong negative fiscal effects, sweeping restrictions on and even the repeal of some 
reliefs were proposed for the tax reform in 2005. But, in the end the reform was 
reduced only to setting an upper limit (ceiling) for almost all non-standard reliefs 
taken together, caused mostly by fiscal reasons (so called “mini reform”).
36 It is usual that such relief is limited to approved relevant institutions as recipients, as well as approved acti-
vities. However, it is not usual to narrow such relief to such a small number of activities/recipients.
37 However, the system, however much of a hybridit was, still remained mostly inside the consumption con-
cept (and its alternative model).
38 For more detailed equity and efficiency arguments see for instance: Blažić (2006:132-135, 147-152); Mija-
tović (2007:294-299), and the further listed references there. 
39 One of the rare attempts was in Blažić (1999).
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Up to this moment (the situation presented in table A2 for 2006 was not changed 
significantly until 2010) Croatia has taken a path relatively in contrast to that 
advocated by contemporary financial science and tax reform from the end of eigh-
ties, whose requirements were renewed right by the economic crisis and fiscal 
consolidation problems. It has gradually and constantly introduced new reliefs, 
which is partially understandable, taking into the consideration the different star-
ting position of Croatia in comparison to most of the developed countries.
But, in the middle of 2010 Croatia abolished all non-standard reliefs, with the 
exception of that for charitable contributions (Government of the Republic of Cro-
atia, 2010:1341). The reasons for the repeal of these reliefs are complementary to 
those of the tax reform from the mid1980s: horizontal and vertical inequity, inef-
ficiency, administrative complexity and the most important reason, the fiscal, i.e. 
the tax revenue loss (tax expenditures) connected with these reliefs. Following the 
classical reform recommendations shortly presented at the beginning of this paper 
the reductions in tax expenditures, i.e. the rise in tax revenues of the income tax 
based on the repeal of these reliefs is used for the reduction of statutory tax rates, 
first of all of the lowest rate (from 15% to 12%) and the abolition of the highest 
rate of 45%.42
There are few analyses of the effects of the reliefs from that period. The calcula-
tions of tax expenditures (revenue forgone) resulting from these reliefs, which 
pointed out their negative fiscal effects are more systematic (Bratić and Urban, 
2006; Bratić, 2006; and afterwards Šimović, 2012b). One of the rare analyses was 
one about vertical equity, i.e. progressivity (Urban 2006a; 2006b). This analysis, 
which used the methodology for measuring the influence of different elements of 
personal income tax on progressivity applied to OECD countries by Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer (2001), showed the negative influence of these reliefs (together 
with all other tax allowances) on progressivity (Urban, 2006a:2; 2006b:217-221). 
It was actually the decrease in progressivity, i.e. the fact that these allowances be-
nefited higher income groups, that mostly influenced the decision of the Go-
vernment of the Republic of Croatia (2010:13) to abolish them. Perhaps before the 
decision to repeal, some rethinking was needed and a thorough cost-effectiveness 
analysis (among other considerations) of existing reliefs should have been under-
taken. This could have resulted in the abolition of some reliefs and a transforma-
tion of the (some of) existing reliefs into tax credits, which are more equitable 
than tax allowances. Maybe even further transformation into income related re-
liefs or even “phasing out” reliefs or some combinations of all the stated transfor-
mation possibilities should have been considered. This could, of course, have 
41 In the stated document the abolishment of all non-standard tax reliefs was mentioned, except of those for 
research and development. Since these reliefs are allowed as the part of personal income tax concerning busi-
ness income taxation, they are not part of this research. Although the mentioned abolishment encompasses all 
the reliefs, the current legislation has still kept the relief for charitable contributions.
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 increased the complexity of reliefs, so maybe this was the crucial element influen-
cing their repeal.
Although the horizontal inequity of the reliefs was put forward as one of the a pri-
ori arguments for their abolishment43, it is directly analyzed and presented later 
also, especially concerning different income types (Šimović, 2012a; 2012b).
So, by repealing all non-standard reliefs (with the exception of those for charita-
ble contributions) Croatia closes the circle, coming back to its starting position 
(1994), with the exception of the relief for charitable contributions. As already 
pointed out, the first reliefs that were introduced in the starting model from 1994 
were actually the reliefs for charitable contributions.
Whether a second round of gradual reliefs’ introduction follows up or it would be 
prevented solely by fiscal consolidation priority remains an open question. It is an 
open question whether a second round of the gradual introduction of reliefs is to 
follow or whether this will be ruled out by considerations of fiscal consolidation.
7 conclusion
Despite long-lasting and recently renewed demands to limit and abolish most non-
standard reliefs, they still play a significant role in contemporary income tax sy-
stems. Furthermore, while previous efforts from the end of the 1980s and early 
1990s were directed not to their abolition but to their limitation, by introducing 
upper limits and repealing only some particular reliefs, newer (2011 in compari-
son to 2006) EU-15 trends imply even some indications of their increase. Altho-
ugh they could be related to the initial reactions to the economic and financial cri-
sis (however, most of such reactions were related to a decrease in personal in come 
tax rates, standard reliefs of personal income tax as well as corporate income tax 
incentives) it seems that not even fiscal consolidations had significantly brought 
about any decrease in non-standard personal income tax reliefs in the EU-15 by 
the end of 2011. It has been proved again that, once introduced, reliefs are extre-
mely hard to abolish and that there are constant efforts for their reintroduction as 
well as introduction of new reliefs.
The situation in the analyzed EU-12 (all except the Baltic countries, Malta and 
Cyprus) and the countries of the region is significantly different. Not only were 
43 It could be rather confusing that the reliefs are at once claimed to increase the horizontal equity of the per-
sonal income tax and blamed for decreasing it. The reason lies in the different starting points, i.e. the con-
cepts (and related measurements) of this equity as well as the stated reliefs. The first concept starts from the 
subjective (and objective) net principle, pointing out that two people do not have the same ability to pay if 
they both have the same income level and one of them has high, nondiscretionary and unavoidable medical 
expenses for instance. In that case, the ability to pay of that person is significantly lower. The opposite con-
cept starts from the income subject to tax (statutory income) as relevant tax base and measure of ability to 
pay (equity and equality) and all the departures from it through different reliefs are claimed to distort that 
concept. It is obvious that these two understandings and measurements have an a priori embedded attitude in 
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non-standard personal income tax relief systems less developed than in the EU-
15, but a significant repeal of reliefs took place in the observed period. Almost half 
of the countries analyzed (including Croatia) have no non-standard reliefs at all 
(end of 2011), which was strongly influenced by the flat tax introduction. But this 
reason is not the only one, since Croatia and Slovenia, which rejected this form of 
tax, still abolished all non-standard reliefs, and the reverse happened in Albania. 
It is obvious that economic (and tax) policy creators in those countries are stron-
gly convinced of the necessity for the repeal of such reliefs, but are also able to 
implement their tax changes easier.
Croatia has gone along an interesting development path concerning non-standard 
personal income tax reliefs – from their non existence until full application and 
back. With the latest changes it joined the dominant situation as well as trends in 
the countries of the region (including the EU-12). These countries have never had 
developed non-standard relief systems or have not had them at all. Some of them 
that had developed such reliefs abolished them mostly simultaneously by the in-
troduction of a flat tax or by following the contemporary tax policy recommenda-
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